Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2004

State of Utah v. William Joseph Ireland : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Frederick Voros Jr.; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellee
Joan C. Watt; Michael A. Peterson; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Defendant/
Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. William Joseph Ireland: Brief of Appellant, No. 20040502 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5046

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

WAN COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH
**m
tlCCUMCNT
KFU
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL50

.A10
DOCKET NO.
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040502-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan,
Judge, presiding. Appellant is incarcerated.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
MICHAEL A. PETERSON (5130)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040502-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Robbery, a first degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), in the Third Judicial District
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan,
Judge, presiding. Appellant is incarcerated.
JOAN C. WATT (3967)
MICHAEL A. PETERSON (5130)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340)
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW,
PRESERVATION

1

TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
CHARGE SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED TO A SIMPLE ROBBERY
WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT DISPLAY A GUN AND DID NOT
MAKE A VERBAL REPRESENTATION REGARDING THE USE
OF A GUN
CONCLUSION
Addendum A: Judgment
Addendum B: Text of Relevant Statutes
Addendum C: Memorandum Decision

6
14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
DeLeon v. Arkansas. 1989 Ark App. Lexis 608 (1999)

13

People v.Knowles. 436 N.Y.S.2d 25, 79 A.D.2d 116 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1981)

12

State v. Adams. 830 P.2d 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

7, 8, 9

State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)

7, 8, 9

State v. Hartmann. 783 P.2d 544 (Utah 1989)
State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)

8, 9
2

State v. Lawrence. 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 318 (Del. Super.
Ct. Aug. 28, 2001), affd, 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002)

13

State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, 506 Utah Adv. Rep. 31

1

State v. Revos. 2004 UT App 151.91 P.3d 861

9

State v. Rvan Wavne Johnson. Case No. 20040522-CA

1

State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987)
Williams v. Commonwealth. 721 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. 1986)

6, 7, 12, 13
10, 11

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003)

2, 7, 9

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003)

2, 6, 7, 9

ii

Page
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409 (2003)

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (2002)

1

iii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20040502-CA

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) whereby
the court of appeals has jurisdiction over first degree felony cases transferred from the
supreme court. A copy of the judgment is in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the evidence supported a
charge of aggravated robbery where the defendant had his hand in his pocket and
demanded money but did not show the clerk a weapon or facsimile and did not make any
verbal representations about a gun or weapon.1
Standard of review. '"The correct interpretation of a statute is question of law and
is reviewed for correctness.'" State v. Pixton. 2004 UT App 275, f 4, 506 Utah Adv.
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A similar issue is before this Court in the state's interlocutory appeal in State v.
Ryan Wayne Johnson, Case No. 20040522-CA. In that case, the trial court granted
Appellee's motion to reduce the charge to simple robbery.

Rep. 31 (quoting State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993)).
Preservation. This issue was preserved below. R. 38-41, 54-61, 114.
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES
The text of the following statutes is in Addendum B:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In an Information filed December 9, 2003, the state charged Appellant William
Ireland ("Appellant" or "Ireland") with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), and theft of services, a class B
misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-409 (2003). Following bind-over
(R. 28), Ireland made a motion to reduce the charge of aggravated robbery to a second
degree felony and filed a memorandum in support of that motion. R. 38-41. After the
state responded (R. 42-44), the trial court held a hearing on the motion on March 17,
2004. R. 114. The trial court subsequently denied the motion on March 29, 2004, and
entered its Memorandum Decision denying the motion on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61.
A copy of the Memorandum Decision is in Addendum C.
Ireland entered a conditional plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, a first degree
felony. R. 73-80. Pursuant to that conditional plea, Ireland explicitly reserved the right
to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the aggravated robbery charge to simple
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robbery. R. 73. The trial court sentenced Ireland on June 7, 2004, and entered judgment
on that same day. R. 94-95. Ireland filed a timely notice of appeal on June 11, 2004.
R. 96. This appeal follows.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey Reinkoester worked as a sales associate in the
Fortier jewelry store on the north end of Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. R. 114:5-6.
Sometime between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m., Reinkoester saw a man, later identified as
Appellant William Ireland, outside the store, walking toward the store. R. 114:6. Ireland
entered the store and Reinkoester greeted him. R. 114:9. Appellant responded by
saying, "I want you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now.'1
R. 114:9.
It was cold outside and Ireland was wearing a large, puffy, perhaps down, coat.
R. 114:10, 11, 19. Reinkoester did not see Ireland's bare hands, and one hand was in a
pocket. R. 114:11. Reinkoester acknowledged that because of the cold, people often
entered the store with their hands in their pockets. R. 114:19. Reinkoester could not
remember whether Ireland reached out and opened the door with a hand or whether he
pushed or pulled the door open. R. 114:17.
The hand in Ireland's pocket was close to his body but pointed toward
Reinkoester. R. 114:11. Reinkoester described it as "gesturing like there was weapon,
but it was more subtle." R. 114:12. Appellant never said he had a weapon or made any

3

verbal statements suggesting that he had a weapon. R. 114:13,23. Nevertheless,
Reinkoester testified that he thought Ireland might have a gun. R. 114:13, 23.
Reinkoester acknowledged that his thoughts about a gun were just speculation and that
he had no concrete reason for speculating that Appellant had a gun as opposed to a knife.
R. 114:23. When Reinkoester filled out the police report, he did not say anything about
the robber having his hands in his pockets; he did indicate that there might have been a
weapon in the robber's pocket, "if there was one." R. 114:25-26, 29.
Reinkoester walked around to the desk where the cash drawer was located.
R. 114:10. He was not looking at Appellant and instead was focused on the cash drawer.
R. 114:21. When Reinkoester got to the desk with the cash drawer, he put what little
cash the store had in a bag; Appellant then asked for jewelry to be added to the bag.
R. 114:13,14.
While at the cash drawer, Reinkoester could not see Appellant's hands because
the desk with the cash drawer was too high. R. 114:14. Reinkoester did not know
whether Ireland's hands were inside or outside his pockets at that point. R. 114:22.
Appellant did not make any physical gestures toward Reinkoester at any time while
Reinkoester was at the desk getting the cash. R. 114:22.
There were four other employees and two customers in the store while the robbery
was taking place. R. 114:12. At about the time Appellant asked for jewelry, the owner
of the store noticed that something was wrong and exited the store. R. 114:14. Ireland
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asked Reinkoester to give him the bag, then went to the front door. R. 114:15.
Reinkoester could not recall whether Ireland took the bag with his right or left hand and
could not remember whether he ever saw Ireland's right hand outside of the pocket.
R. 114:15.
The owner was blocking the door, but Appellant pushed and finally got the door
open. R. 114:15. The owner then chased Ireland and retrieved the bag and money.
R. 114:15; 116:4.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in refusing to reduce the charge from aggravated to simple
robbery. All robberies involve a threat and fear by the victim. In order to elevate a
robbery to an aggravated robbery, the conduct of the defendant, not the subjective
reaction of the victim, controls. Moreover, in order to maintain the distinction between
an aggravated and simple robbery, the defendant must do more than create a threat or
cause fear; instead, the defendant must make a tangible representation that he has an item
and, further, make a tangible representation that the item in his control is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. A hand in a pocket pointed in the direction of the
victim, in the absence of a verbal representation, fails to rise to this level.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
CHARGE SHOULD NOT BE REDUCED TO A SIMPLE ROBBERY
WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT DISPLAY A GUN AND DID NOT
MAKE A VERBAL REPRESENTATION REGARDING THE USE OF A
GUN.
The only issue in this case is whether the charge should have been reduced from
aggravated to simple robbery where Appellant had his hand in his pocket and pointed
toward the salesclerk when he entered the store, but made no verbal representations or
threats about the use of a gun.
In State v. Suniville. 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the supreme court held that the
defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he had his hand in his pocket
held up over the counter as if he had a gun, with something pointing at the victim, and
made threats that he would "blast" people if they did not cooperate. \d_. at 962. The
version of section 76-6-302 then in effect defined aggravated robbery as a robbery where
the perpetrator used lf a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm." Id- The Suniville court
concluded that the defendant's actions did not amount to an aggravated robbery because
he did not use a weapon or a replica of a weapon. IdL at 964-65. In reaching that
conclusion, the Court reasoned that any other holding would "erode the statutory
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id., at 965. The court stated in
part, "Defendant's menacing gesture accompanied by verbal threats is not sufficient
evidence alone to establish the use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. To hold
6

otherwise would pervert the language of section 76-6-302 and erode the statutory
distinction between robbery and aggravated robbery." Id..
Following the decision in Suniville, the legislature amended the aggravated
robbery and dangerous weapon statutes. The current version requires the use or
threatened use of a dangerous weapon and defines a dangerous weapon in part as a
facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-302 (2003),
76-1-601 (2003). Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (2003), which outlines the elements for
aggravated robbery, states, "(1) [a] person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he: (a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b) (2003) defines a dangerous
weapon as "a facsimile or representation of an item, and (i) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any
other manner that he is in control of such an item." Id., (emphasis added).
Under the current version of the statute, this Court has interpreted the term
representation in the dangerous weapon statute to include a verbal representation that one
has a firearm. See State v. Candelario. 909 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v.
Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Nevertheless, the concerns outlined in
Suniville that the distinction between aggravated and simple robbery must be maintained
and that defendant must do or say something tangible beyond the force and fear involved
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in any robbery continue to control. This Court's holdings that a verbal representation by
the robber that he has a gun is sufficiently tangible to support an aggravated robbery
maintains a distinction between the two crimes that is lost when a hand in the pocket
without verbal representations is used to elevate the crime.
For example, the defendant in Candelario claimed to have a gun and threatened to
kill the clerk but did not physically portray possession of a firearm. Id., at 277. Under
these circumstances, the determination of whether a gun was involved was not left to the
subjective reaction of the victim because the defendant verbally represented that he had a
gun. This Court concluded that the term "representation" refers not only to a physical
likeness, but also to "a statement conveying an impression for the purpose of influencing
action." Id. at 278.
The robber in Adams verbally threatened to use a gun while also "put[ting] his
hand on his bulging pocket, leading [the victim] to believe [the robber] had a gun and
reasonably fear for her safety." Adams, 830 P.2d at 313. This Court upheld the
aggravated robbery conviction because "[threatening to use a dangerous weapon while
committing a robbery . . . is sufficient to fit within the aggravated robbery . . . statute[]."
Id. In reaching the decision in Adams, this Court relied on State v. Hartmann, 783 P.2d
544 (Utah 1989), which upheld a conviction for aggravated sexual assault where the
defendant raped a woman while verbally telling her that he had a gun. IcL This Court
concluded in Hartmann that the use or display of a dangerous weapon is not required
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when the defendant makes a verbal threat to use a dangerous weapon. Id., at 547.
Recently, in State v. Revos. 2004 UT App 151,91 P.3d 861, this Court again held
that a defendant's statements that he had a gun were a representation that elevated a
robbery to an aggravated robbery even if the defendant did not have a gun. In that case,
the defendant yelled, "[g]et the gun and shoot" and "shoot to kill." Id_., 1f 4. This Court
reasoned that defendant's statement "clearly conveyed an impression' that a gun would
be used for the purpose of influencing action[]" and the aggravated robbery charge was
therefore appropriate. IdPursuant to Adams, Candelario, Hartmann, and Reyos, a charge of aggravated
robbery would have been appropriate //Appellant had made verbal representations
regarding a gun. Appellant did not make any such verbal representations, however, and
instead simply had his hand in his pocket and had it pointed at the clerk. To be convicted
of aggravated robbery, Ireland had to have "use[d] or threatened] to use a dangerous
weapon." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon statute requires a
representation, that is, some sort of likeness, coupled with either a verbal representation
that the item is a dangerous weapon or some representation "in any other manner" that
the robber is in control of an item that is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b).
The use of the word "and" in section 76-l-601(5)(b) demonstrates that something
more than just a representation of an item is required; instead, the defendant must make a
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representation of an item and further represent that the item is likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury. Even if the hand in the pocket were considered a "representation
of an item," it fails to meet the requirements of subsection (ii) since it does not amount to
a representation that the item is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. In fact,
in this case, Reinkoester speculated that there was a weapon in the pocket but had no
basis for determining whether the item in the pocket was a gun or a knife or capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury. R. 114:23. The witness's testimony that he was
afraid Appellant might shoot was his subjective response to the fear he felt during the
robbery and was based on speculation rather than a representation by Ireland that he had
a weapon capable of causing serious bodily injury. Allowing a witness's subjective
reaction under circumstances that necessarily involve threats and fear fails to make a
workable distinction between simple and aggravated robbery.
The court in Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986),
concluded that the defendant did not commit an aggravated robbery where he "threatened
the night clerk by reaching towards his back pocket and cautioning, "Do you want your
life?" Id. at 711. Similar to the present case, the clerk in that case testified "that when he
was threatened, he believed 'maybe he (Appellant) had a weapon or something.'" Id.. In
rejecting the aggravated robbery charge, the court recognized that threat of harm exists in
simple robbery as well as aggravated robbery, and the two charges must be distinguished
by something other than the threat of physical harm. Id. Moreover, the victim's response
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to a threat cannot define the nature of the crime and a victim's speculation that there
might have been a weapon does not support an aggravated robbery charge. This is so
because the degree of the crime would be left to the subjective response of the victim, not
the actions of the perpetrator. Id. at 712.
To do otherwise places defendant virtually without defense at the caprice
of a victim's subjective evaluation without regard to the actual course of
events and could lead to convictions for crimes neither intended nor
enacted. Our heritage of justice applies the law to the facts. Herein the fact
is that although force was threatened, the presence of a weapon or
instrument was illusory at best. Without an instrument's ever being seen,
an intimidating threat, albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot
suffice to meet the standard necessary for a first degree robbery conviction.
Id. at 712. While a verbal threat to use a gun would suffice for an aggravated robbery
charge, in Williams where the defendant threatened only to hurt then reached toward his
back pocket, the facts did not rise to an aggravated robbery. Indeed, labeling a crime as
an armed robbery under these circumstances would blur the distinction between simple
and aggravated robbery. The Williams court recognized this, stating:
This, however, does not distinguish it from second degree robbery in which
the threat of physical force is the gravamen. A response of perceiving
danger is quite real under threat; however, such cannot serve to convert
something merely speculated upon (a weapon or instrument) into
established existence . . . . Without an instrument's ever being seen, an
intimidating threat albeit coupled with a menacing gesture cannot suffice to
meet the standard necessary for a first-degree robbery conviction . . . .
Without something tangible backing up the threat, words do not reach
beyond the status of threats and as such are insufficient to sustain
submission under first-degree robbery.
Williams. 721 S.W. 2d at 72, 713.
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Focusin^ on the actions of the defendant rather than the subjective response of the
victim is consistent not only with Suniville but also with the language of subsection (ii)
which requires the robber to represent that he is in control of an item that the victim
reasonably believes is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. This reasonable
belief language necessarily involves an objective review of the defendant's conduct
rather than a focus on the victim's subjective reaction.
The trial court in this case improperly focused on the witness's subjective belief
rather than the objective facts of what Ireland did in concluding that the charge should
not be reduced to simple robbery. In so doing, the trial court eroded the distinction
between the two charges and left defendants "at the caprice of a victim's subjective
evaluation" (id. at 712) in determining whether an aggravated robbery was committed.
The trial court also relied on decisions from other states which do not control and
which address statutory language distinct from that in Utah. For example, in People v.
Knowles. 436 N.Y.S. 2d 25, 79 A.D. 2d 116 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1981), relied on by the trial
court at R. 59, the court was interpreting a statute that made it a second degree felony to
"[display] [] what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other
firearm." Id. at 116. Under New York's statutory scheme, use of a loaded and operable
gun was a first degree felony whereas display of what appears to be a gun, but was not in
actuality a loaded and operable gun, was a second degree felony. Id., at 118-119. The
issue in Knowles was whether the use of a hand fit within this middle level of severity
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rather than the lower third degree felony category applied to robberies when the
perpetrator did not display what appeared to be a gun. Based on the language of the
second degree robbery statute and the New York statutory scheme delineating three
levels of robbery, the court concluded that use of a hand fit within the middle level of
severity.
The Delaware statute under consideration in State v. Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super.
LEXIS 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2001), affd. 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), also relied
on by the trial court in this case at R. 59, defined a first degree robbery as a robbery
where the "defendant 'display' what 'appears' to be a deadly weapon." Id_. at 7. The
defendant in that case "had cloth wrapped around his hand and jabbed it in the victim's
direction. When Defendant struck her in the left cheek, it apparently felt like a hard
object." Id. at 8. Under these facts, the defendant "displayed" what "appeared" to be a
deadly weapon; see also DeLeon v. Arkansas, 1989 Ark App. Lexis 608 (1999) (relied
on by the trial court at R. 59-60) (interpreting statute that states, "[a] person commits
aggravated robbery if he commits robbery, while armed with a deadly weapon, or
represents by work or conduct that he is so armed").
As the supreme court recognized in Suniville, the distinction between aggravated
and simple robbery would be eviscerated if a hand in the pocket without verbal threats to
kill or use a gun would elevate the crime to an armed robbery. All robberies necessarily
involve fear by the victim and threats causing this fear which propels the victim to
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respond to the robber's request. But a robbery where the robber actually carries a gun,
facsimile or other dangerous weapon or represents that he has a gun raises a far greater
threat than a robbery such as this one where the robber simply had his hand in his pocket,
pointed toward the victim.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant William Joseph Ireland respectfully requests that the order of
the trial court denying his motion to reduce the charge to a second degree felony be
reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court to allow him to withdraw his
conditional plea.
SUBMITTED this n ^ day of September, 2004.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 031908349 FS

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

PAUL G. MAUGHAN
June 7, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
nicolel
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PETERSON, MICHAEL A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 20, 1967
Video
Tape Number:
Video
Tape Count: 9:18
CHARGES
1. AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/05/2004 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Credit is granted for time served.
Page 1

<?4

Case No: 031908349
Date:
Jun 07, 2004
Credit is granted for 185 day(s) previously served.
Defense motions court to sentence defendant as second degree felony
based on rule 402. State objects to motion.

Page 2 (last)

ADDENDUM B

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during the
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a
robbery.

76-1-601.

Definitions.

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting,
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO. 031908349

:

WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND,
Defendant.

:
:

This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Ann.

Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial,

and intends to enter a guilty plea.

The sole issue before the

Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2003,
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S.
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store
employee.
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket.
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow
extending toward the back or behind the defendant.

While the
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now."
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun."
11.)

The witness also described

(Hearing Tr. p.

the defendant's hand

defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me."

in the

(Hearing Tr. p. 11.)

He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely
gesturing

like

there was

(Hearing Tr. p. 12.)
the

defendant

had

a weapon, but

it was more

subtle."

The witness then testified that he thought
a

weapon

based

on

the

motioning

defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket.

of

the

(Hearing Tr. p.

13.)
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a
gun because

of

the gesturing

defendant's coat pocket.

of

the defendant' s hand

(Hearing Tr. at p. 16.)

in the

Additionally,

the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a
weapon.

(Hearing Tr. at p. 27.)

At the time of the robbery, the

witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand,
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at
p. 27.)

It was the witness's further impression that the defendant

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 3

STATE V. IRELAND

intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun
in his pocket; and he did so believe.

(Hearing Tr. at p.28.)

The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann.

This issue appears to be one of

first impression in the state of Utah.
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961

(Utah 1987), the Utah

Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery,
don ! t turn it into a homicide.
962.

Give me all of your money."

Jd. at

The defendant approached the teller with his right hand

inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter.
witness
pocket."

testified

that,

Id. at 962.

"something was pointing

at me

The

in his

Based upon those facts and the statute in

effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon....").
In

apparent

response

to

the

Suniville

decision,

the

legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads
in pertinent part:
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous
weapon....
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as:
(a) any item capable of causing death or
serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the
item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent
intended use of the item leads the victim to
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) The actor represents to the
victim verbally or in any other manner that he
is in control of such an item.
A

review

of

the

case

law

in this

state

since

Suniville

indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket.
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992).

See,

This Court

must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation.

This Court

concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above.
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon.
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant
in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this case that the
defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a
representation.

Therefore, the State is within its discretion in

charging this matter as a first degree felony.
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes
similar to ours.

Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually

displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect
is the same on the victim.

A facsimile of a gun can cause no more

harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a
gun, whether by word or action.
that found in New York.

The Utah statute is similar to

New York's law reads:
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second
degree if he forcibly steals property and if,
in the course of the commission of the crime
he "[displays] what appears to be a pistol,
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or
other firearm."
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981).

The Supreme Court appellate division

of New York held in Knowles:
We hold today that if a person who is in fact
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a
manner that is intended to convey to his
victim the impression that he is holding a
firearm, that said person has committed
robbery in the second degree within the
meaning of the statute quoted above.
436 N.Y.2d at 25.
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v.
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318
2001),

aff 'd,

790

A.2d

476

(Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28,

(Del. 2002),

held

that

the

term

"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim
reasonably felt that the defendant was armed.
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas,
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999), which interpreted another statute
much like Utah's.

In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience

store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk,
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?"

.Id. at * 2 .

As the clerk
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his
pocket or a gun."

Id.

The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated

that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or
threatening.

Id. at *4.

This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and
concludes that
threatening

"representation" includes not only words, but

gestures

and movements which

would

indicate

the

defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon.
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is
upheld.
The State is to prepare the appropriate Findings, Conclusions
and an Order.

X>W--"

••: *i\

Dated this <*-~~ day of April, J^'4wJ

I
PAUL G?" &AUGHAN /
/)
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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